Jump to content
Not connected, Your IP: 216.73.216.179

Leaderboard


Popular Content

Showing content with the highest reputation on 02/04/26 in all areas

  1. 3 points
    I open a support request https://airvpn.org/contact/
  2. 2 points
    Staff

    UK VPN age verification

    Hello! Interesting thread indeed, thank you. Our position is close to the EFF position you can read here: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/08/no-uks-online-safety-act-doesnt-make-children-safer-online We will keep you informed. So far, you probably know well our approach with similar, lower or higher requests from Russia, China and a few other countries, and there's no plan at the moment to change our position. In general, we think that it is impossible that those persons who advance, propose or defend such dangerous laws in so called democracies are in good faith (except in peculiar cases where they suffer from some mental illness or carry a neurological deficit). They have an hidden agenda developed on the myth of pervasive control but more importantly fueled by monetary reward. Yes, that's a motivational reason, maybe almost as strong as monetary reward and votes. Moreover, there is a real possibility that such laws lead on the short run to an increase in support (and therefore votes) which, net of dissent, is positive, even though by tiny tenths of percentage which are anyway not negligible for an embarrassingly inept ruling class that's incapable of developing serious strategies to improve the life of teenagers and children. Their total failure is proven by the official data (England and Whales police records in this case) that show a dramatic rise of sexual offenses against children in the UK in the last 5 years in spite of (and someone could even argue because of) more and more laws allegedly thought to protect children. Where does this 0.1% come from? If you want to stay real please adjust this quota (since 2025, start multiplying that percentage by 250 to begin with). Furthermore, there's no money involved to use Tor, its usage is totally free and well beyond Ofcom abilities to control it. However, it's true that people may find it boring because it's like 10 times slower than a VPN with a decent infrastructure. It would indeed. However, we seriously doubt that the ramshackle British institutions, always short of funds, can surpass the GFW designers and maintainers in efficiency, competence and grandeur of operation. And note that the GFW is routinely bypassed nowadays by the most and least skilled to connect to a wide range of VPNs. Our aggregate data show that this claim is deeply incorrect, at least for AirVPN, if we consider p2p improper usage quantified by DMCA and other warnings. It's not the majority, on the contrary it is a tiny minority. Where does this assumption come from? We would like to assess official stats to compare them with what we gather on the field. Kind regards
  3. 1 point
    Hello! Starting from February 1st, 2026, Debian (e.g. Trixie) enforces stricter OpenPGP policies and no longer accepts repository signatures involving SHA1-based certifications. As a result, users may see errors such as: Get:4 http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease [3,954 B] Err:4 http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Signing key on C181AC89FA667E317F423998513EFC94400D7698 is not bound: No binding signature at time 2025-01-14T13:07:46Z because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance because: SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z Warning: OpenPGP signature verification failed: http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Signing key on C181AC89FA667E317F423998513EFC94400D7698 is not bound: No binding signature at time 2025-01-14T13:07:46Z because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance because: SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z Error: The repository 'http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease' is not signed. Notice: Updating from such a repository can't be done securely, and is therefore disabled by default. Notice: See apt-secure(8) manpage for repository creation and user configuration details. This was caused by an outdated signing key certification used by the repository. Solution The repository signing key has been regenerated and the repository is now correctly signed again. To restore updates, please re-import the updated maintainer key: curl -fsSL https://eddie.website/repository/keys/eddie_maintainer_gpg.key | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/eddie.website-keyring.asc > /dev/null Then run: sudo apt update Sorry for the inconvenience, and thanks for your patience. Kind regards
  4. 1 point
    Thanks a lot for the quick fix and the clear instructions! I removed my temporary Sequoia policy workaround, re-imported the updated maintainer key as posted, and apt update is working again on Debian Trixie. Much appreciated.
  5. 1 point
    Hi, since 2026-02-01 my Debian Trixie system can’t update the Eddie APT repo. Debian repos are fine, only eddie.website fails. Error: http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease sqv: Policy rejected signature because SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z Key: C181AC89FA667E317F423998513EFC94400D7698 Is there an updated repo signing key / re-signed InRelease available (SHA256+), or a recommended fix/workaround until it’s updated? Thanks!
  6. 1 point
    Hello! Please see here: https://airvpn.org/forums/topic/79065-eddie-desktop-apt-repository-signing-key-update/ Kind regards
  7. 1 point
    Thanks for sharing. This workaround helped on my system too. I’ll use it temporarily, but a proper fix would be an updated/reissued repo signing key (no SHA1). Any update from the maintainers?
  8. 1 point
    Had this Problem yesterday too and found a Workaround. Treat this as a temporary workaround. apt uses "Sequoia PGP" to verify signatures. By default, sqv is configured to accept the SHA1 hash algorithm only until Feb 1st 2026. To Resolve this for a period of Time, reconfigure sqv, copy /usr/share/apt/default-sequoia.config to /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/apt-sequoia.config, and change the date from 2026.02.01 to 2026.06.01 in the line the Repo should Update again until 2026.06.01, better Solution would be an updated signing Key.
  9. 1 point
    Hello! As noted the claimed vulnerability and PoC was/were not filed through the proper channels. According to the report we could finally access, the vulnerability affects macOS (not Windows or Linux), only in case the user checks "Preferences->UI->CLI" in order to have "eddie-cli <options>" available in a command line interface. macOS is the only system for which the stand alone Eddie CLI version is not offered. While the report is being investigated please do not enable that option and run Hummingbird if you need a CLI based program to connect. We will update this thread and of course, should the problem be confirmed, the devs will release a new version. Kind regards
  10. 1 point
    Hi, This may be the case. Regardless, the question stands: are the Eddie developers looking into this? Development of Eddie seems really lacking at present, there are several open issues on Github, particularly on Mac, that have not been fixed in spite of being reported over a year ago. The issues have not even been replied to. This really isn't filling me with confidence. Please can a member of staff assure us customers that this issue is being looked in to? And when can we expect a fix for the macOS permissions issue? Thank you.
×
×
  • Create New...