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Hello! Interesting thread indeed, thank you. Our position is close to the EFF position you can read here: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/08/no-uks-online-safety-act-doesnt-make-children-safer-online We will keep you informed. So far, you probably know well our approach with similar, lower or higher requests from Russia, China and a few other countries, and there's no plan at the moment to change our position. In general, we think that it is impossible that those persons who advance, propose or defend such dangerous laws in so called democracies are in good faith (except in peculiar cases where they suffer from some mental illness or carry a neurological deficit). They have an hidden agenda developed on the myth of pervasive control but more importantly fueled by monetary reward. Yes, that's a motivational reason, maybe almost as strong as monetary reward and votes. Moreover, there is a real possibility that such laws lead on the short run to an increase in support (and therefore votes) which, net of dissent, is positive, even though by tiny tenths of percentage which are anyway not negligible for an embarrassingly inept ruling class that's incapable of developing serious strategies to improve the life of teenagers and children. Their total failure is proven by the official data (England and Whales police records in this case) that show a dramatic rise of sexual offenses against children in the UK in the last 5 years in spite of (and someone could even argue because of) more and more laws allegedly thought to protect children. Where does this 0.1% come from? If you want to stay real please adjust this quota (since 2025, start multiplying that percentage by 250 to begin with). Furthermore, there's no money involved to use Tor, its usage is totally free and well beyond Ofcom abilities to control it. However, it's true that people may find it boring because it's like 10 times slower than a VPN with a decent infrastructure. It would indeed. However, we seriously doubt that the ramshackle British institutions, always short of funds, can surpass the GFW designers and maintainers in efficiency, competence and grandeur of operation. And note that the GFW is routinely bypassed nowadays by the most and least skilled to connect to a wide range of VPNs. Our aggregate data show that this claim is deeply incorrect, at least for AirVPN, if we consider p2p improper usage quantified by DMCA and other warnings. It's not the majority, on the contrary it is a tiny minority. Where does this assumption come from? We would like to assess official stats to compare them with what we gather on the field. Kind regards

Hello! Starting from February 1st, 2026, Debian (e.g. Trixie) enforces stricter OpenPGP policies and no longer accepts repository signatures involving SHA1-based certifications. As a result, users may see errors such as: Get:4 http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease [3,954 B] Err:4 http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Signing key on C181AC89FA667E317F423998513EFC94400D7698 is not bound: No binding signature at time 2025-01-14T13:07:46Z because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance because: SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z Warning: OpenPGP signature verification failed: http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Signing key on C181AC89FA667E317F423998513EFC94400D7698 is not bound: No binding signature at time 2025-01-14T13:07:46Z because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance because: SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z Error: The repository 'http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease' is not signed. Notice: Updating from such a repository can't be done securely, and is therefore disabled by default. Notice: See apt-secure(8) manpage for repository creation and user configuration details. This was caused by an outdated signing key certification used by the repository. Solution The repository signing key has been regenerated and the repository is now correctly signed again. To restore updates, please re-import the updated maintainer key: curl -fsSL https://eddie.website/repository/keys/eddie_maintainer_gpg.key | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/eddie.website-keyring.asc > /dev/null Then run: sudo apt update Sorry for the inconvenience, and thanks for your patience. Kind regards

I open a support request https://airvpn.org/contact/

Hello! Please see here: https://airvpn.org/forums/topic/79065-eddie-desktop-apt-repository-signing-key-update/ Kind regards

Hello! The "range" is specified by mask /32, so it's this single unique address. Yes, it's plausible that some past event flagged the IP address. We don't know the internals of Tailscale but definitely this behavior should be investigated. Why an attempted connection to this specific IP address and why this port? Kind regards

Hello! There's nothing listening to port 54037 on any AirVPN server. We can't see why Tailscale seeks a connection to it, anyway we are sure now that there's no malware there as there's nothing. Probably Malwarebytes behavior comes from some past event or it's yet another over-blocking case. Kind regards

the effective MTU of the tunnel is limited by the smallest MTU anywhere along the path Hello! On our servers the MTU limit is 1420 bytes on a standard Ethernet frame because of IPv6 over IPv4. For PPPoE see also https://www.hitoha.moe/wireguard-mtu-over-pppoe/ So, if you set 1432 bytes MTU for your WireGuard interface, the fragmentation will occur on our servers, not on your side. The upper, actual limit is the lowest MTU in the path, in other words the smallest MTU on the path silently limits the tunnel. The 12 bytes difference may be negligible and most packets will not be fragmented, and you will not see fragmentation on your side, but you could notice a performance hit on upload (upload from you to the server we mean). Kind regards

@Zack Hello! The IP address you mention is assigned to AirVPN server Asellus in the Netherlands. Please mention explicitly port Y, we want and must verify what your app (mention the app too if possible) will find on that port, it's important. Kind regards

I'm seeing the same issue. For now you can still download from Eddie's own website. I know it looks kind of sketchy but this is a real website by AirVPN and is linked to in the FAQ. https://eddie.website/

Thanks a lot for the quick fix and the clear instructions! I removed my temporary Sequoia policy workaround, re-imported the updated maintainer key as posted, and apt update is working again on Debian Trixie. Much appreciated.

Hi, since 2026-02-01 my Debian Trixie system can’t update the Eddie APT repo. Debian repos are fine, only eddie.website fails. Error: http://eddie.website/repository/apt stable InRelease sqv: Policy rejected signature because SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z Key: C181AC89FA667E317F423998513EFC94400D7698 Is there an updated repo signing key / re-signed InRelease available (SHA256+), or a recommended fix/workaround until it’s updated? Thanks!

Thanks for sharing. This workaround helped on my system too. I’ll use it temporarily, but a proper fix would be an updated/reissued repo signing key (no SHA1). Any update from the maintainers?

Had this Problem yesterday too and found a Workaround. Treat this as a temporary workaround. apt uses "Sequoia PGP" to verify signatures. By default, sqv is configured to accept the SHA1 hash algorithm only until Feb 1st 2026. To Resolve this for a period of Time, reconfigure sqv, copy /usr/share/apt/default-sequoia.config to /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/apt-sequoia.config, and change the date from 2026.02.01 to 2026.06.01 in the line the Repo should Update again until 2026.06.01, better Solution would be an updated signing Key.

Its a shame. These were among the absolute fastest (especially Chumukay) when they came on board. They smoked the high powered Chicago servers but they are not reliable for the past week or two. Right across the border in Chicago apparently nobody is attacking those servers.

Hello! As noted the claimed vulnerability and PoC was/were not filed through the proper channels. According to the report we could finally access, the vulnerability affects macOS (not Windows or Linux), only in case the user checks "Preferences->UI->CLI" in order to have "eddie-cli <options>" available in a command line interface. macOS is the only system for which the stand alone Eddie CLI version is not offered. While the report is being investigated please do not enable that option and run Hummingbird if you need a CLI based program to connect. We will update this thread and of course, should the problem be confirmed, the devs will release a new version. Kind regards

Hi, This may be the case. Regardless, the question stands: are the Eddie developers looking into this? Development of Eddie seems really lacking at present, there are several open issues on Github, particularly on Mac, that have not been fixed in spite of being reported over a year ago. The issues have not even been replied to. This really isn't filling me with confidence. Please can a member of staff assure us customers that this issue is being looked in to? And when can we expect a fix for the macOS permissions issue? Thank you.

I don't understand. Except adding IP in Network route out of VPN, I don't have any solution.

Hello! We're very glad to inform you that two new 10 Gbit/s full duplex servers located in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, are available: Taiyangshou and Vindemiatrix. The AirVPN client will show automatically the new servers; if you use any other OpenVPN or WireGuard client you can generate all the files to access them through our configuration/certificates/key generator (menu "Client Area"->"Config generator"). The servers accept connections on ports 53, 80, 443, 1194, 2018 UDP and TCP for OpenVPN and ports 1637, 47107 and 51820 UDP for WireGuard. They support OpenVPN over SSL and OpenVPN over SSH, TLS 1.3, OpenVPN tls-crypt and WireGuard. Full IPv6 support is included as well. As usual no traffic limits, no logs, no discrimination on protocols and hardened security against various attacks with separate entry and exit-IP addresses. You can check the status as usual in our real time servers monitor : https://airvpn.org/servers/Taiyangshou https://airvpn.org/servers/Vindemiatrix Do not hesitate to contact us for any information or issue. Kind regards & datalove AirVPN Staff