Suggestion: Implement HPKP (pinning) on airvpn.org

[userusingused 4]

HPKP (HTTP Public Key Pinning) is a strong way to protect against Man in the Middle attacks by sending a fingerprint of the certificate to the browser, and on subsequent visits, the browser will compare the fingerprint to the stored one, and will abort the connection when when they do not match.
The idea behind the implementation is kind of the same as HSTS(HTTP Header, trust on first use and has a expiry age), but by limiting the certificates to your CA or even the specific server certificates, MitM becomes much harder.
Some more info on implementation:
https://scotthelme.co.uk/hpkp-http-public-key-pinning/?PageSpeed=noscript

Both Firefox and Chrome already support it since v35. IE unfortunately not, but they're always behind. IE just started supporting HSTS a few months ago, while Chrome and Firefox already support it for 5 years.

[zhang888 1066]

This will break the site in case someone will try to access it behind an SSL inspecting proxy.

Which, as should be assumed, not so uncommon scenario for a public VPN provider.

 

HSTS mitigates -almost- all MiTM risks - except one that includes a valid CA that will sign the same CommonName object.

The best part of this is that it will not break usage in case of SSL proxies.

[Staff 9972]

For readers' comfort: HSTS is implemented in airvpn.org

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=airvpn.org

 

HPKP is not planned.

 

Kind regards

[userusingused 4]

This will break the site in case someone will try to access it behind an SSL inspecting proxy.

Which, as should be assumed, not so uncommon scenario for a public VPN provider.

 

HSTS mitigates -almost- all MiTM risks - except one that includes a valid CA that will sign the same CommonName object.

The best part of this is that it will not break usage in case of SSL proxies.

That should not be the concern of the website doing HPKP, but the SSL proxy. When HPKP gets more traction in the future, SSL proxies will have to deal with this. I don't know if there is a way to make it compatible and still enjoy the benefits, but they could easily strip the HPKP headers and nothing would break.

 

A valid CA signing the same CommonName object is not the only concern. In the past attackers have breached CA's in order to do it themselves. And besides governments forcing CA's to cooperate, there are also government owned CA's that can easily do it themselves.

 

For readers' comfort: HSTS is implemented in airvpn.org

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=airvpn.org

 

HPKP is not planned.

 

Kind regards

I hope you'll reconsider HPKP for the future.