[feature request] support for multiple certificates

[44blablabla 2]

It would be awesome if the client area had an option to regenerate the client certificate (in case it leaked) and to generate multiple certificates. This would allow the usage of a seperate unique certificate for every of the 3 possible parallel connections.

The rationale behind this is that I don't trust my android cell phone but still would like to be able to use airvpn on my android. With multiple certificates that would be possible without risking the privacy of the other vpn connections.

[zhang888 1066]

Air uses TLS authentication which means Perfect Forward Secrecy is enabled.

In such setup, even if an adversary captures your traffic and saves it, and then obtains your certificates and keys in any way, the traffic cannot be decrypted in a reasonable timeframe.

 

That means there is no risk to even share your keys with others (if you dont mind that they will use the allowed 3 connections, of course)

[44blablabla 2]

My understanding of perfect forward secrecy might be wrong but I always assumed that it only protects old data, that is traffic which was recorded before the used certificate/private key was captured. But if someone can get the certificate / private key, it should be possible to decode all further communications after this point in time (due to MITM). 

[44blablabla 2]

Btw are you sure perfect forward secrecy is used? My openvpn says I'm connected using DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA. DH probably means diffie hellman which offers PFS, but RSA does not.

[Staff 9893]

Hello,

 

note that your definition of PFS is wrong:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy#Perfect_forward_secrecy

 

We confirm to you that our cryptographic setup satisfies the properties of PFS. From your client logs you can see that Data Channel keys (used to encrypt the traffic) are re-negotiated every hour through DHE (Diffie-Hellman Exchange).

 

Kind regards

[44blablabla 2]

Thx for your answers, I think I got it now. So basically a leaked client cert would only allow an attacker to impersonate the clients identity but doesn't result in access to the sessions master key as the parameters used to calculate it are only authenticated, not encrypted, using the private key. This makes PFS even better than I thought it was