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Hello, I am still a VPN newbie so I thought I would ask these questions on this forum to get a better idea of how the service works. Allow me to ask three of them: 1. Purely theoretically, if a law enforcement agency such as the FBI was suspecting somebody was using one of your servers for illegal purposes (whatever they may be), and sent you an official letter to share information about the usage of the VPN server in question at any given point in time (for example, the VPN server was used to access a Gmail account at a particular time, and the FBI would reach out to you and ask you who used that VPN server exactly at that time), how would AirVPN respond? Do you have, as a service provider, a legal obligation to respond to such requests? As far as I know, you do not keep any logs, so would there be any information that you would even be able to give to the law enforcement agency? I would really appreciate elaboration from you on how this scenario would play out. Not that I want to do anything illegal, it is just a theoretical question. 2. I read somewhere on the internet that if a VPN provider says they do not keep logs, it is often a false statement, and even if they do not keep logs, usually the upstream ISP of the VPN provider (the ISP through which the VPN servers are connected to the Internet) do keep logs. I would like to ask you what you think of this theory and whether it may represent a potential risk of logging. In other words, even if you do not keep any logs at all yourself, can it be a potential security risk that the upstream ISP you use for your servers does keep logs, and, as a result, could potentially give this logging information to potential law enforcement agencies? 3. If I use AirVPN over Tor, meaning I connect from my computer to the Tor network first and from there to the VPN server, will the Tor exit node periodically change in order to make the route more anonymous? Because if the Tor exit node did not change and an attacker was controlling both the guard (entry) Tor node I would be connecting to, as well as the Tor exit node that would be connecting to the VPN server, although the attacker would not be able to see the actual traffic, he would see the amount of bytes flowing through from one end to the other, and if the attacker also got control of, for example, the websites I would be visiting via the AirVPN server, he could correlate the amount of bytes flowing from my real IP to the entry node, then through to the exit node and finally to the destination server of the websites I would be visiting, thereby deanonymizing me. So that is why I am asking if the exit node changes when the traffic is routed through the AirVPN over Tor channel. If it does, I think I can feel safer?