Staff

Hello! We're glad to inform you that the problem has been solved. Kind regards

Hello and thank you for your patience! We are working to solve the problem as soon as possible. In the meantime, please simply disable the DNS check from inside Eddie. Select "AirVPN" > "Preferences" > "DNS" and untick "Check Air VPN DNS". Click "Save" and start a new connection. That's all. DNS check is a redundant option so you can keep it disabled safely while we work to fix the issue. Side note: you are running an archaic Eddie version (2.11.15). Latest stable version is 2.13.6, you might like to upgrade. Kind regards

Hello and thank you for your patience! We are working to solve the problem as soon as possible. In the meantime, please simply disable the DNS check from inside Eddie. Select "AirVPN" > "Preferences" > "DNS" and untick "Check Air VPN DNS". Click "Save" and start a new connection. That's all. DNS check is a redundant option so you can keep it disabled safely while we work to fix the issue. Kind regards

Hello and thank you for the head up! The communications between the nodes inside the VPN have always meant to be blocked. Nodes can communicate inside the VPN only with common services, such as DNS server for example, since Air birth. We have found a flaw in the recent updated configuration and we have fixed it, can you please test again now? Should you find any further issue, please specify also which server(s) you experience the problem on. Kind regards

Hello! Yes, but it's not recommended. "europe2.vpn.airdns.org" for example is resolved to the highest rated server at the moment of the generation, if you force resolution you will always connect to the same server. As explained in the tooltip, that's useful in case of DNS poisoning (China for example). Previous versions of Config Generator had an option to dump all servers with many "remote" directives, to allow OpenVPN to pick (randomly) a server, but the option was disabled because OpenVPN doesn't accept more than 64 "remote" directives. if necessary, you might anyway emulate that option by editing the file with a text editor (with "remote-random" and then a maximum of 64 " remote" directives, see also https://airvpn.org/topic/14378-how-can-i-get-vpn-servers-entry-ip-addresses for this purpose). Anyway, europe2.all.vpn.airdns.org contain all IP servers of the picked region, as explained here: https://airvpn.org/topic/14378-how-can-i-get-vpn-servers-entry-ip-addresses Kind regards

Thanks. That's helpful. I can determine the IP addresses from that. Shouldn't resolve hosts put the actual IP address in the configuration file? Hello! Yes, thanks for the head up, this is a critical bug, it will be fixed. The CG also generates invalid names when you select entry-IP 2, exactly as you reported. Going to investigate and fix. Kind regards

Hello! The names you entered do not exist. Please replace them with: america2.vpn.airdns.org asia2.vpn.airdns.org europe2.vpn.airdns.org Kind regards

Hi there! I have a FTTH 1 Gbps, without AirVPN I get 945 Mbps (that is 115+ MB/s). With Airvpn turned on it is 100 - 150 Mbps (that is max 15 MB/s). No limitation on my hardware. I think that Airvpn HAS a an uplimit. Or not? Hello! Is your system Windows? We have had some reports according to which some Windows systems can't beat 130-140 Mbit/s with the current tun/tap driver. We can't confirm or deny, but it deserves more data collection. Kind regards

Hello! All the routing servers are used and the graphs are displayed correctly, as far as we can see. About AU2, it's used, but not much. In the last year the peak bandwidth was 8 Mbit/s only! Kind regards

Hello! Note that the fact that Canada is black listed is irrelevant in your case, because according to your description you have defined lists for the servers. Try this: - delete any list both on servers and countries - white list United States - test again If the problem persists with the above list (i.e. Eddie connects to a Canada server) please send us a system report. Kind regards

Hello, this a logic flaw or a typo. Probably you meant "on the opposite of what the writer of the rebutted article meant", i.e. the writer claims that it's mandatory to build a business model based on false, lying "no traffic logging / inspection" policy in consideration of our prices, while the rebuttal shows how the legal framework and the working infrastructure of AirVPN prove the contrary after more than seven years of operations. The rebuttal also explains why lying on the no logging and no inspection policy would be catastrophic under a purely business view. This is obvious, and actually the rebuttal has been written with the account of AirVPN Staff, so there is total transparency and no ambiguity. It's not that the rebuttal has been written in the name of someone who pretends to be outside AirVPN or anyway super-partes in disguise. Luckily the fact that we fight for freedom of expression does not prevent us to exercise such fundamental right whenever we wish so. In reality we do. In a VPN where all clients are known and trusted, a client might like to share its devices with any other client, but this is a special case which does not happen normally, not even in corporate VPNs. It would be a paramount security hazard. A more common usage of shared resources in a VPN is sharing some resources not belonging to each client. This is what happens in AirVPN too, where you share some resources inside the VPN, without never going out of the VPN itself. Specifically, a client in AirVPN can use DNS inside the VPN (no query of the client gets out of the VPN itself), and access other (different than ICANN) namespaces. A client accesses also other resources (geo-routing / micro-routing etc.), always inside the VPN. We might also add additional shared resources inside the VPN in the future. With a proxy, you never share resources inside a virtual network, simply because you are not in a virtual network. The similarity you mention might be born by a confusion. When the VPN offers also a gateway to other networks, as AirVPN does, the client traffic passes through different private and public IP addresses before its traffic is routed to the final destinations from the public, exit-IP address. What happens with a proxy is profoundly different, and the similarity is misleading: the traffic that's sent through a proxy never enters a virtual network, is not necessarily encrypted between your node and the proxy node, is only a part of your system traffic (only TCP), and continues its route to the Internet from the very same public address some application in the system sends the packets to. Your system default gateway and routing table remain the same and your system does not have another network interface to rely on. Some significant examples which show how this difference in behavior is very important are also mentioned in the rebuttal and cover the predominant usage of our service, if not the totality of it. As an additional, side note, it remains to be seen how and if a proxy can prevent spoofed packet injection in your DNS queries and in incoming traffic content with the same effectiveness provided by our service, as well as in fake personification based attacks. Kind regards

No, and you will be unable to punch a hole. Your OpenVPN client will refuse connections to begin with. However, as you know, data to and from HTTPS servers will be compromised and visible, if you allow them to poison the chain of trust of your system (often, in a corporate environment, the employee/office computer, property of the company, is already compromised, of course). It is already, have you tested it? With Eddie, use SSL tunnel to port 443, entry-IP 4 (when you configure this connection mode, you will see that only Castor and Chara will be available, all the other servers will appear in red and not available). Kind regards

Hello! Totally correct. To go further, in Eddie we have even removed the server certificate verification in stunnel, because the additional SSL/TLS tunnel is not required to provide data protection or integrity. It must only punch a hole through which then OpenVPN can break free. All the packets security and integrity is up to this second OpenVPN tunnel inside the stunnel tunnel. So, we don't want that stunnel verifies the certificate and breaks the connection. Let the censors and the voyeurs believe that they can inspect your traffic through the certificate hoax, and use this fact at your advantage. You just need to be aware that they can detect OpenVPN fingerprint (this issue can be resolved with tls-crypt, which is currently available on Chara and Castor only but will be widely deployed later in April and early May). Kind regards

It sounds like a bug, can you help us reproduce it? Describe a step by step procedure to reproduce the bug with Eddie 2.14.2beta please at your convenience. Remember, though, from your description it looks like you have white listed a country, and then black listed a series of servers. When you define two lists, one for the countries and one for the servers, the servers list takes precedence over the countries list. That's intended (we prefer this logic now: older Eddie versions performed an intersection of the lists and this caused a lot of confusion on users). Kind regards

@hugomueller Hi, can you please publish a full system report as well? "Logs" > click the life belt icon > copy all > paste in the message Kind regards

Hello! We will put this issue on the table of the lead Eddie programmer with high priority. At the moment there are no hotkeys to select the buttons you mentioned and we will seek for a solution that can be quickly implemented, if possible even in the next release which is imminent. Kind regards

Hello! That's correct. Each Air VPN server runs its own DNS server. If you query our DNS, the queries never get out of the tunnel, so you have a guarantee that they can't be hijacked or forged. Additionally you have some advantage in terms of performance, since you don't need that our servers forward the queries to a third party DNS which is outside the VPN. Kind regards

Hello, both screenshots show that your system does not have any traffic leak. Screenshot 2 shows that IPv6 is working on the server, while screenshot 1 shows that it's not. It's the same server, however, don't assume that IPv6 will always work as long as we don't officially announce full IPv6 support (which will allow you on most servers to reach IPv6 services even if you have only IPv4). Kind regards

Hi, SSH is over TCP, so it's not relevant in this case. Again sorry for the annoying lack of precision with SOCKS5. Well, at least it does not change the essence and the meaning, i.e. you just can't tunnel the traffic of an UDP only application with a SOCKS5 proxy, because you need TCP to establish the connection and give the SOCKS5 proxy all the instructions on how to route the subsequent UDP packets etc. If you come to know about a working proxifier that implements real UDP support with a remote SOCKS5 proxy feel free to let us know. Kind regards

Hello! In general the comparison was made with proxies which could offer encryption, so in reality only with HTTPS proxies, which do not support UDP at all. Sorry for the imprecision. Just out of curiosity, anyway the UDP support of SOCKS5 proxies is quite problematic on the "client side", even if you decide that your UDP stream does not need encryption. The initial handshake must be in TCP, not in UDP. This cuts out any application which can send and receive UDP only. An additional application (a proxifier) needs to tell the SOCKS5 proxy (in TCP) to forward UDP packets (on behalf of the application which speaks only UDP) until the TCP connection is closed, and it also needs to tell the proxy where to forward those UDP packets to. The proxifier application (or maybe in the future the built in proxifier included in an UDP software) would therefore need to do a lot of more job. So not only you need a SOCKS5 proxy correctly configured to forward UDP packets according to the instructions received in TCP, but you would also need a proxifier that implements such support, which is currently unavailable. It is very problematic and inefficient, because you still have a TCP "channel" that must direct operations. It's tested. more secure and faster to just wrap UDP into UDP with OpenVPN, forget TCP and not worry about re-implementing timeout handling, packet re-ordering etc. (all features widely peer reviewed with OpenVPN). And above all you don't send out an UDP stream in clear text. See here for a more detailed analysis: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/20976189/how-can-we-set-up-proxy-server-dealing-with-udp-packets Kind regards

Hello! Multiple keys allow you to: selectively pick remotely forwarded inbound ports by device/key connect multiple devices to the same VPN server by using a different key on each device have different, device-specific DNS block lists A dedicated panel to manage your client certificates and keys is accessible in our web site. In order to access the main control panel click Client Area while your account is logged into the AirVPN web site. The Devices button provides you with access to a panel to administer your client certificate/key pairs. The panel lets you use a multi-certificate/key support from AirVPN, a comfortable and convenient feature. You can have multiple pairs, renew them and issue completely new ones. From each device of yours you will be free to use any pair you like. Therefore you can keep all of your certificates and keys under control, administer them and also connect multiple devices to the same server and port by using a different key on each device. Eddie 2.13.6 or higher version is required. In Eddie's Overview window a menu which will let you choose a key before you start a connection will appear automatically when you create a new certificate/key par from your account control panel (note: restart Eddie and log your account out and in again if such menu does not appear). To create a new certificate/key pair click the button labeled Add a new device. The Configuration Generator has been modified as well, in order to let you generate configuration files with the certificate/key pair you wish. Let's see in details how to use the "Devices/Keys" options. Device Name and Description: these are free name and description which you can associate to any pair for your comfort. Click the pencil icon to edit. Details opens a window showing various information: Type, Creation date, Last renew date and Last VPN connection. In the same window you can find the following actions: Renew: when you click this action button, the corresponding certificate will be revoked, and a new certificate/key pair will be issued. Delete: this action button will revoke the corresponding certificate, without issuing a new one. DNS: this action button will let you enter the DNS block list panel for that specific certificate/key pair to let you define, activate or de-activate specific DNS block lists, exceptions and additions, which will apply to that pair only. View history and View Active will toggle with each other to provide you with any relevant information on the history of your actions about keys and the current active list. Some caution when using the aforementioned features: if you revoke or renew a certificate/key pair which is being used by some connected device, that device will soon be disconnected in Eddie Desktop edition, you will need to log your account out and then in again to force Eddie to pick a different pair (new or old) (*) - in Eddie Android edition this is not necessary to use new pairs, you will need to re-generate and import configuration files if you use them with some third-party software, or if you run OpenVPN or Wireguard directly (*) unchecking "Remember me" is necessary in older Eddie versions Kind regards and datalove AirVPN Staff

Hello! DISCLAIMER: this post has been written by an AirVPN co-founder (Paolo) and merges the information and the points of view elaborated by the Air founders in more than seven years. Other Air VPN staff members might add additional comments in the future. We have been asked via Twitter to reply to the following post: https://gist.github.com/joepie91/5a9909939e6ce7d09e29 We see that the issues raised by the aforementioned article may be of general interest, so we have decided to post a detailed rebuttal here, meant to fix the remarkable amount of technical misunderstandings and errors which have led the writer to astonishingly wrong conclusions and worrying generalizations. The rebuttal is based on AirVPN only; we can not and we do not want to write in the name of any other service, since most of the considerations you will read here may or may not (and sometimes we know that they will not) apply to other "VPN services". Anyway, it is our right to reply as if the writer were talking about us too, because he/she repeatedly claims that ALL VPN services act in the same way. A "VPN in this sense" is NOT a proxy. Our service encrypts and tunnels all of the client system TCP and UDP traffic to and from the VPN server. Moreover, our service, when used with our free and open source software, also makes additional steps to prevent traffic leaks outside the VPN tunnel. A proxy tunnels (and not necessarily encrypts) only TCP traffic (proxies can not support UDP), and only the traffic of those applications which are configured to connect to a proxy. UDP traffic, system traffic and traffic of applications which may be started by the system and that you failed to configure (or that you can't even configure in Windows, in some cases) are not necessarily tunneled to the proxy. Not even your system DNS queries are necessarily tunneled over the proxy. If we were really interested in logging our clients traffic, we would not allow connections to and from Tor, proxies and other VPNs. We have always made very clear how to bypass the problem of "trust us" when you can't really afford to do that, and our answer has always been "partition of trust". Please see for example our post dated March 2012 (!) about it: https://airvpn.org/topic/54-using-airvpn-over-tor/?do=findComment&comment=1745 There's more. We work under a legal framework where the safe harbors for the mere conduits are very rigidly and clearly defined (specifically, by the 2000/31/EC, the E-Commerce Directive, articles 12, 13, 14 and 15). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031 The liability exemption for the mere conduit status would not exist if we were not mere conduits. If we inspected traffic and/or modified traffic (e.g. through content injection) and/or selected source and destination of the communications, we would not be mere conduits and we would lose the legal protection on liability exemptions. We have also two decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union which clearly define indiscriminate data retention as infringing the fundamental rights of the citizens of the EU: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/cp160145en.pdf Therefore: under a legal point of view, logging and/or monitoring and/or inspecting and/or modifying the content of our customers traffic without the customers explicit and written consent would be a criminal infringement, also subject to civil prosecution by the customers themselvesunder a business point of view, that would be simply suicidal (more on this later) It is enigmatic how the writer can make such claims. We charge less than 10 USD per month for our services and we can pay a whole legal firm, 250 servers (physical, bare metal servers), the whole staff, including a tiny team of programmers. We also regularly donate money to organizations and projects whose activities are compatible with AirVPN mission. https://airvpn.org/mission https://airvpn.org/status We're not here only for the money, but if the writer wants to talk about money, so be it. He/she may rest assured that we have planned seriously a business model which remains robust if not rock solid. It is obvious that we must keep our business model solid, because our infrastructure has become large and we have duties toward the people working with us and toward our customers. At the same time we never forget that our customers have transformed into reality the dream to build a rather big project based on and aimed to privacy protection in a time when the whole world was going to the opposite direction. By changing now direction and pointing to a business based on privacy infringements and personal data commerce would not only betray our beliefs and mission and customers, but we would become a goldfish in an ocean of sharks, we could not even think to compete. After 7 years, we have the right and knowledge to claim that a privacy protection mission is not incompatible with the price the writer mentions and with a strictly agnostic network where no traffic inspection or monitoring is enforced. We can also claim confidently that any business plan based on data protection and privacy infringements not declared in the terms of service would crash dramatically in the short-term in the EU: remember the legal framework we live in and feel free to do your own research on real cases and incidents in the recent past. Last but not least, please do your own math and compute the costs to store and "hand a customer traffic data over": they imply costs of losing the mere conduit status, added to the costs of civil lawsuits from that and potentially other tens of thousands customers. Then compare them to the "costs" (in reality benefits) of no monitoring at all added to the peace of mind to strictly act in a legal/lawful way. Given all of the above, you can easily discern that the quoted assumption is false for AirVPN. The logical, unavoidable conclusion is that AirVPN best interest, even under a purely cynical, business point of view, is to NOT log (in the most extensive sense of the term) customers traffic and not commerce with their data. This is partially, only partially, true. HideMyAss was really risking to go out of serious privacy protection business soon after the incident occurred: check the massive uproar caused by the event. The AVG acquisition, with the disruptive marketing power of AVG, has probably covered the issue, but the old HideMyAss management hurried to sell the whole Privax company. Who knows, maybe just in time, maybe before the value could be hit too seriously by the incident. We can't know for sure, and the writer can't as well. Anyway, if the writer wants to claim that marketing is powerful, we agree (what a discovery!). The logical jump from HMA incident to the assumption that every service does what HMA did is long. Do not forget that what HMA did would pose a huge amount of legal problems to us, as explained. HideMyAss targeted the same persons who are happily using the new Facebook VPN. We respect the intelligence of our customers and we don't have the arrogance to think that we can change people mind and competence all over the world in a few years (or ever), and we don't even think that we can oppose the marketing power. More importantly, that's a problem pertaining to HideMyAss. It is not only unfair, but even defamatory to surreptitiously imply that the behavior (good or bad) of certain services is the same behavior of any other service, in the same field or not. We have been providing AirVPN services since 2011, when we offered the service as a beta version totally free. Now we challenge the writer of the article to provide any single proof that any single user identity has been compromised by us through a betrayal of our terms of service and our mission and/or through traffic logging or inspection and/or by any infringement of the EU legal framework on privacy and personal data protection. False. We provide our users with any tool to never make their "real" IP address appear to our servers. We have also integrated AirVPN over HTTP proxy, AirVPN over SOCKS proxy, and AirVPN over Tor usage in our free and open source software. We don't even block connections from competitor VPN servers. Finally, we accept not only Bitcoin, but Monero and ZCash as well, which are designed to provide a robust anonymity layer on the transactions. If you really don't trust us, you can easily make your IP address never visible to our servers. This is particularly important even if you trust us, but you can't afford (for the sensitivity of the data you need to transmit, for example) to assume that our servers are not monitored by hostile entities, an event that can happen with ANY service, not only VPN services. The fact that we have made every human effort to provide effective and easily usable protections against such occurrences is a proof of our interest in the protection of our customers privacy. This is ambiguous, because we would need the writer to define security scope and context exactly. Is he/she referring to integrity and security of data between your node and our servers? Or security of your system? Surely, our service is not meant as a security tool to protect against virus and spyware, and this is clearly stated at the very beginning of our Terms of Service. AirVPN can't do anything if your system is compromised. However, the above does not imply in any way that our service is a glorified proxy. See the reasons we mentioned above and verify how a loose security mention does not change anything. Additionally, while OpenVPN is the core of our service, it is complemented by an important series of features aimed to protect privacy and data in all of those cases which OpenVPN alone has not been designed for. Even if you don't run our free and open source software, we and our community have made any effort to provide guides and insights on how to get the most from our service to integrate it in a comprehensive environment aimed to protect your data and identity. We are very grateful to our community for the invaluable contributions throughout the years. If we were a "malicious VPN provider", does the writer really think that we would have allowed our forums to become a golden source of information for privacy, identity and data protection? Do you really think that we would have been provided monetary support to TorProject, OpenBSD, European Digital Rights, Tor infrastructure, etc. etc.? A part of this has been widely rebutted in our previous reply. Here it will be sufficient to add that even if you don't use end-to-end encryption, even if you don't use Tor on top of an AirVPN connection, a MITM who sniffs the packets in any point between the VPN server and the final destination (including the final destination itself of course) will see those packets coming from the VPN server exit-IP address, NOT from your real IP address and NOT from the entry-IP address of the VPN server you connect to. This is a paramount point which is incompetently (intentionally?) ignored by the writer. It is so important that in some extreme cases it makes the difference between imprisonment and freedom, or even between life and death. Imagine the case of a whistleblower giving out relevant information via VoIP or other applications relying on UDP to a self proclaimed journalist who then betrays the confidentiality of the source, or even to a serious journalist who is unaware of the fact that his/her computer is compromised, or that his/her line is wiretapped. The whistleblower can't use a proxy reliably. The journalist, or the wiretapping entity, can trace the source IP address and the identity of the whistleblower can be disclosed (just to make a trivial example which does not require any wiretapping or compromised system, think of Skype exploit, for which any party could discover the IP address of the other party). In most of these cases, end-to-end encryption would have been irrelevant for the whistleblower. Whenever the source can't trust the destination integrity, whether the recipient is in good faith or not, our service makes a vital difference. True. We have never said or written the contrary. In addition to changing IP address, which is anyway important in spite of the writer claims, further steps are strictly necessary to prevent profiling, from "separation of identities" to script blocking, from browser fingerprint changes to system settings obfuscation. Our community has widely covered this issue and provided precious suggestions. Here the writer makes a totally irrational shift: first he/she wants to make you think that our service is just a "glorified proxy", then he/she wants to insinuate that our service is useless because it is not some sort of supernatural system capable to protect users from their own behavior and from every possible tracking system which exploits the user system, not the service. The first case is true, and it is very important. However, it is totally false that you can safely rely on a proxy for the second case purpose. Many applications, including torrent software, can: bind to the physical network interface, or do some dangerous UPnPuse UDP (not supported by a proxy)send DNS queries out of the proxyinclude the assigned "real" IP address inside their layer of communications, example: https://blog.torproject.org/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-ideaIn the aforementioned cases, correct usage of our service will fulfill the purpose to never disclose your real IP address and/or the UDP traffic and/or the DNS queries. A proxy will not and you can be potentially tracked back, either by copyright trolls or any hostile entity. Additionally, our service has many more use cases: tunneling UDP traffic (not available with a proxy or Tor)circumventing censorship based on IP addresses blockcircumventing censorship based on DNS poisoningpreventing injection of forged packets (not necessarily available with a proxy even in TCP, and surely not when you need UDP flow integrity)using Tor anyway when Tor usage is blocked or triggers interest of ISP or any hostile entity about youprotecting your identity when the final recipient of your communications is compromised (not available with end-to-end encryption alone, and not available with Tor when you need UDP, imagine if you need to stream a video in real time which requires source identity protection)making your services (web sites, torrent clients, FTP servers for example) reachable from the Internet when your ISP does not allow port forwarding (not available with a proxy), without exposing your IP addresshaving a static exit-IP addressbypassing various types of traffic shapingtunneling simultaneously the traffic of all the devices in your local network, even with remote port forwarding, and even those which can't run OpenVPN provided that you have a device acting as a gateway to the VPN (typical examples a pfSense box or a DD-WRT / AsusWRT / Merlin / Tomato etc. router or any computer configured to work as a router)and maybe you can see more use cases which we have missed here. The fact that the writer omitted all of the above says a lot about his/her competence and/or good faith. This is hilarious, and not only because the whole point of the writer's post ends up into advertising LowEndBox. We will not insult our readers' intelligence with an explanation of why that is a terrible idea when you seek more privacy and some anonymity layer in your interactions with the Internet. Draw your own conclusions. Kind regards and datalove Paolo AirVPN co-founder

Hello! You can consider to enforce permanent firewall rules that block all the outgoing traffic from your system. In this way, the activation of Network Lock will unlock communications to our VPN servers and bootstrap servers only. When Network Lock is disabled, the previous "block all" rules will be restored. This means also that as long as Eddie has not started, your system traffic is totally blocked (even at boot). Just make sure that you allow anyway DHCP communications to your router, they are vital to establish a connection inside your local network. Kind regards

Hello! We're sorry, this option is not available in Eddie built-in preferences. You need to implement it with custom OpenVPN directives: use "remote-random" and a list of "remote" entries. Kind regards

Hello, please have a look here as well: https://airvpn.org/topic/19909-eddie-with-other-providers-or-custom-openvpn-configuration-files/ Kind regards